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Abstract
Some key challenges to nuclear power plant operators are monitoring the myriad indicators on the control boards and making 
decisions accordingly. Especially minor transients at the plant, such as a small leak in the cooling system, may not be readily 
apparent until they reach a critical threshold. If operators were able to draw on early indicators to such upset conditions, it would 
generally make the mitigation of the faults straightforward by allowing ample time for correction. In this paper, we outline
conditions that can impact operator decision making. We propose a computerized operator support system to assist operators in
detecting, validating, diagnosing, mitigating, monitoring, and recovering from faults. It is proposed that computerized operator
support systems can effectively augment reactor operators without taking away operator control. Computerized operator support 
systems are not automated control systems, but rather advisory systems to enhance operator performance.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Background
For nuclear power plants, there is a trade-off in control philosophy between automatic system control and 
operator control. Some automatic systems are used when there is insufficient time for operators to diagnose and 
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respond to fast-moving events. The plant operates in an envelope of conditions that are supervised by the plant 
protection system, in the form of setpoints for protective actions that will be automatically invoked if the thresholds 
are exceeded. These automatic actions generally have to be conservative to stay ahead of plant events, and are 
designed to put the plant in a safe and known condition, such as a reactor trip. Other automatic actions are part of the 
plant control system and maintain important plant parameters at the desired operating points by making some 
adjustments to plant components such as valve positions and pump speeds. These control actions relieve the plant 
operators from the burden of continuous, tedious manual control of these components. 
In less time-critical and more nuanced situations, operator actions are preferred because it is especially important 
to keep the plant online if possible. These situations occur with higher frequency and are less severe than those dealt 
with by the current plant protection system. In these situations human operators are superior at diagnosing the causes 
of the situation and performing mitigations that preserve the margin of safety without being overly conservative. 
Rather than trying to enhance operator response to these situations through automation, the nuclear industry has 
instead focused on making these events less frequent by investing in equipment reliability and redundancy. 
However, these seemingly trivial events continue to happen in spite of the focus on equipment reliability. 
A recent report [1] described the benefits of automating operator actions for transients. The report identified 
situations where  alternate configurations and actions  can mitigate the need for a safety actuation given adequate 
time . These situations may be limited by the ability of the operator to accurately diagnose the cause of the upset and  
take  needed actions in the available time. The ability to accurately diagnose the situation is, in turn, often limited by 
the available instrumentation to characterize both the fault and the ability of the operator to integrate the instrument 
readings into a correct diagnosis. The risk of a late or inappropriate response is such that it has been judged better to 
invoke safety actions and accept the outcome of lost production such as might occur due to a precautionary reactor 
trip. 
Any delays in procedure-based manual control actions may possibly result in the protection setpoints being 
reached, leading to an automatic reactor trip or other safety system actuation. Even when the operator is successful 
in arresting a plant transient and averting safety actions, the time required may negatively impact plant operations. 
The longer a transient is unmitigated, the larger the degree that the plant is subjected to off-normal conditions and 
the more of a challenge it is to arrest the plant excursion and return to within-normal operating parameters. 
Over time, operator performance is expected to increase through better instrumentation and control, training and 
protocols, and increases in system reliability. In 2010, the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) issued 
Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 10-02 Engaged, Thinking Organization [2], which described a 
number of safety lapses that had recently occurred in the industry and highlighted a number of organizational 
shortcomings associated with these events. Among these were: 
• Lack of monitoring and cross-checking of critical indicators.
• Operators and shift managers distracted by ongoing control room activities and failing to maintain oversight. ͒
• Weaknesses in worker knowledge, and more specifically in understanding the basis of procedures, systems and 
components, and integrated plant operations. 
• Low risk awareness, particularly in off-normal plant conditions. 
The SOER also contained a number of recommendations to improve safety performance at the leader, supervisor, 
and individual levels. These included re-emphasizing a number of important principles that are foundational to the 
industry’s safety culture including: 
• Oversight of plant operations and control room crew performance, particularly control room monitoring of plant 
parameters.
• Managing control room distractions.
• Use of significant operating experience.
• Use of error-reduction tools.
• Consideration of most-likely undesired consequences of actions.͒
• Improved worker knowledge.
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The SOERrelied on improvements in management systems and human performance. It did not introduce any new 
concepts but rather reinforced current performance expectations. However, it is reasonable to think that the safety 
lapses that led to the SOER were not beyond the scope of the current performance expectations, and had these 
expectations been fully met, many if not all of these situations would likely have been avoided, or at least greatly 
reduced in significance. The industry has certainly benefitted from the response to the SOER in reinforcing these 
expectations, and no doubt additional safety events have been avoided. However, the ongoing problem is that the 
industry continues to struggle with the consistent application of these fundamental performance expectations because 
they rely on human performance, which is always subject to variation. The industry operating record over the recent 
past indicates that the trend in performance is, at best, flat, and that the means of achieving continuous improvement 
in plant operations has been elusive.
It is therefore reasonable to consider additional means of achieving the level of operator performance that is 
desired. There is no question that technology is underutilized for this purpose. In contrast, other industry sectors 
have amply demonstrated that technology operator advisory systems (see [3] for a review), can enhance operator 
human performance while maintaining the role and responsibility of the licensed operator as the independent and 
ultimate decision-maker.
Digital control systems and sophisticated computer algorithms are now capable of analyzing, diagnosing, and 
suggesting mitigations to even the most complex and fast-moving situations. Such systems could assist the operators 
in achieving a more accurate and timely response to component faults and plant transients. Development of such 
technology could prove to be enormously beneficial to the currently operating nuclear plants, as well as the array of 
new types of nuclear plants that are now being built or proposed. This would result in better management of plant 
upsets, improved operator performance, and ultimately make a positive impact on the nuclear industry’s fundamental 
objectives in the areas of nuclear safety, production, and cost management. In this paper we explore how operators 
could be assisted by a sophisticated plant monitoring and diagnosis system. 
2. Introduction to Computerized Operator Support Systems
A computerized operator support system (COSS) is a collection of capabilities designed to assist operators in 
monitoring overall plant performance and making timely, informed decisions on appropriate control actions for the 
projected plant condition. This particular concept of a COSS is framed as an operator advisory system, assisting 
operators in diagnosing and mitigating certain plant events that, unless addressed in a timely manner, would likely 
result in a plant transient or reactor trip. This is most often the domain of the plant’s Abnormal Operating 
Procedures (AOPs). These procedures are symptom-based with one or more entry conditions that have to be 
recognized by the operator. These would include alarm conditions, equipment faults, and plant parameter trends.
There can be time-pressure associated with these plant upsets to recognize the AOP entry conditions, enter the 
appropriate procedure, and then work through the diagnostic steps until the correct mitigation actions are taken to 
resolve the situation. In some cases, the underlying fault is not  identified at a component level, but instead the
consequences of the fault are managed. For example, there might be a leak on the reactor coolant system that is 
identified by its symptoms (high containment humidity, high containment sump level, etc.) but the exact location of 
the leak cannot be determined, other than it is inside containment. However, the AOPs are structured such that the 
mitigation actions are effective without knowing the exact location of the leak after determining the general 
location.
In all of this, the operator is the point of integration of all control room information and has to use what is termed 
“operator fundamental knowledge” to ensure that indeed the control room is applying the correct procedure for the 
plant upset. Operators are trained to use a number of human performance enhancement techniques to assess the 
situation correctly, such as using a questioning attitude and validating all information. In addition, there are a 
number of other techniques used in the control room at a crew level, such as pre-job briefs, time-outs, repeat-back 
communications, independent verifications, etc. While the use of these techniques has proven to be very helpful and 
necessary, it adds to the mental workload and increases the time delay in responding to the actual plant upset.
The control room crew typically follows a general pattern in reacting to a plant fault as follows:
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x Detection – recognizing the symptoms of a plant fault
x Validation – determining that the symptoms are the result of a real plant fault and not a sensor failure
x Diagnosis – determining the specific plant fault
x Mitigation – either correcting or isolating the plant fault such that it is no longer a threat to plant operations or 
nuclear safety
x Monitoring – monitoring the symptoms of the plant fault to ensure that the mitigation has been successful
x Recovery – restoring the plant to the pre-fault conditions
The control room procedures, particularly the AOPs, assist the operator with these tasks, provided that the correct 
procedures have been entered. However, these procedures are not specific in certain areas and rely on the operators 
to perform certain knowledge-based functions, such as estimating the size of a leak based on available plant 
indications. For example, a leak size can be roughly determined by the percent decrease in a tank level from the 
known steady-state value. Operators are exceptionally good at performing these tasks, but the high workload 
associated with certain plant events creates an environment in which the operator may commit errors that compound 
the original fault and impact the plant more so than would otherwise have occurred. A well designed COSS can 
assist an operator at each stage of the fault response sequence to reduce workload and confirm important 
information. Table 1 illustrates the functions of a COSS as it assists an operator in responding to a COSS.
Table 1.Operator and COSS functions.
It is important to note that a COSS is not an extension of the control system, but rather an advisory capability for 
the operator, to be used as the operator determines to be prudent and useful. While the COSS will passively collect 
data as a background function, at no time will it interact with the plant other than as directed by an operator.It is 
Step COSS Function
Detection: Detect a plant anomaly before an operator would notice it.This could actually be detected in
the noise-level of the instrument signal and recognized longbefore it would be noticeable as a 
parameter trend or reach an alarm setpoint.
Validation: Determine whether an apparent fault is real or caused by sensor failure by cross-checking 
related plant parameters and calculating whether the sensor in question is reading correctly.
Diagnosis: Determine what type of fault would explain the values of the related sensors once they had 
been validated as reading correctly.This is based on using various means to model the 
expected behavior of a plant system. This could also include physics-based models that 
perform calculations for mass and energy balances to accurately determine the location of the 
fault condition.In other words, the plant system model is compared to the validated readings 
of the actual plant to locate precisely the point of deviation from expected behavior.The 
COSS could provide a graphical depiction of the fault to the operator for quick 
comprehension of the nature of the situation.
Mitigation: Determine if there is a successful mitigation for the plant fault other than putting the plant in 
a safe condition (e.g., manual reactor trip prior to automatic protective actions).If so, the 
appropriate procedure could be displayed for the control room crew to begin actions.The 
COSS either allows the operator to execute the procedure in the normal manner, time 
permitting, or directly executes the relevant sections of the procedure as a script.
Monitoring: Determine whether the plant parameters indicating the apparent fault are trending towards 
values that indicate that the fault has been mitigated, and inform the operator that the 
mitigation actions are  effectively being carried out.
Recovery: Direct the operator to the appropriate recovery procedures based on the extent of the plant 
upset due to the fault.An example would be determining the volume of fluid lost during a leak 
to know the magnitude of the make-up requirement.Another example would be determining 
the time available to remain in an emergency plant configuration, such as relying on batteries 
until normal power is restored.
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well-recognized that the COSS cannot encroach on the duties and responsibilities of a licensed operator, and 
therefore certain protocols must be upheld at all times:
x No plant control actions would be taken by the COSS. 
x COSS recommended control actions would be executed either by manual operator actions or through an 
approved computer-based procedure system with soft-control capability, and then only as commanded by the 
operator, including the execution of automated sequences of steps.
x The logic of the COSS in advising in the various steps of the fault response process must be assessable and 
transparent to the operator.
x The operator is free to disregard or turn-off the COSS at any time, and then address the plant fault using 
traditional control room protocols.
x The operator can take manual control of any automated procedure sequences at any time during the execution. 
Likewise, the operator can reinitiate automated sequences at any time.
3. Computerized Operator Support System Prototype
In order to validate the COSS, a functional prototype was developed using a digital control system (DCS) 
architecture developed at Idaho National Laboratory [4]. The COSS is a composite system that features several 
distinct yet equally important elements. For the purposes of the prototype, four separate facets of the COSS were 
considered: 
• Digital Alarm System: The COSS includes advanced alarms that are designed to combine the spatial pattern 
recognition afforded by traditional annunciator boards with supplemental information to help the operator 
understand the cause of the information. The COSS digital alarm system provides a trend display for key 
indicators coupled with multistate colored alarms for warning and alarm states. The alarm trend displays also 
incorporate a mechanism for showing sensor drift or failure.Computer-Based Procedure (CBP) System: The 
COSS also includes a CBP system. The CPB closely mimics the paper-based procedures for abnormal and 
emergency operations, including the common two-column format with a left-hand column for the preferred 
operator action and a right-hand column for response not obtained. The CBP builds on paper-based procedures 
by providing digital indicators embedded in the procedures and soft controls the operator can activate within the 
procedures.Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID): The P&ID provides a schematic of key plant 
components in a system. This display includes visible indicators of key states (e.g., valve position pump 
energized or tank level) as well as the actions available to the operator (e.g., open or close valve). It highlights 
faulted components or systems. 
• Recommender System: The heart of what makes the COSS distinct from advanced DCS displays is the 
recommender system. The recommender system monitors plant states and provides suggestions to the operator 
to help diagnose problems and take actions. The recommender system monitors multiple sets of sensor data and 
can provide early warnings of emerging system faults (e.g., rapidly lowering level) before they are alarmed. The 
recommender system interacts with the digital alarm system, CBP system, and P&ID displays, directing the 
operator to relevant information and available actions and procedures.
To realize the benefits of co-equal information sources to the operator, the different parts of the COSS are 
combined into a single display in the prototype (see Fig. 1). Note that the Main Display Area may alternate between 
the P&ID and CBP view. A more detailed description of this interface may be found in [3]. This display may take 
the place of a DCS display, but the functionality, particularly the recommender system, exceeds typical DCS 
implementations. The underlying philosophy of the COSS is that it should both support the tasks the operator must 
perform and aid him or her in the completion of those tasks whenever possible. Such assistance should be minimally 
intrusive to manual operations. 
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Fig. 1. Annotated COSS display window.
It is important to clarify the difference between the COSS recommender system and a CBP system. A 
recommendation provided by the recommender system is not equivalent to a procedure or procedure step. Rather, 
the recommender system augments the CBP by directing the operator to the appropriate procedure based on the fault 
diagnosis. In the prototype version of the CBP, the recommendations are based solely on the procedures, and 
mitigation actions are not provided other than by the procedures. Additionally, the recommender system is not 
designed to offer step-by-step operational guidance but may provide a high-level explanation of what actions the 
operator needs to take without providing the precise steps required, which are explicated in the CBP. Whereas the 
recommender system provides top-down guidance, the CBP provides bottom-up instructions to the operator. 
The COSS prototype is integrated into the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability 
(LWRS) Human Systems Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) located at INL. The HSSL is a full-scope, full-scale glass 
top simulator capable of simulating existing and future nuclear power plant main control rooms[5]. Developing the 
COSS within the context of the HSSL provides a number of advantages. First, by simulating a physical control 
board, the location and size of the COSS display can be iteratively evaluated to determine the optimal placement and 
sizing. The second advantage is scalability. The functionality of the COSS can be expanded to include other 
systems, such as the turbine control system, which may not be modeled on part-task simulations. Lastly, embedding 
the COSS within a high fidelity testing environment enables the demonstration to reflect how the actual technology 
would be used by providing a realistic environment for operator studies. Consequently, integrating the COSS with 
the HSSL enhances the validity of the concept as well as the practical applicability. 
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4. Human Factors Considerations and Next Steps
The prototype represents a software collection of the different elements of the COSS, integrated in a manner that 
attempts to keep the advantages of the individual elements. The assembly of these elements into the integrated 
COSS represents initial design decisions. However, it was found in this research that in many cases, the COSS was a 
first-of-a-kind prototype, and applicable design standards could not be readily referenced. A human factors 
evaluation can help address unknown aspects of the design to arrive at an effective COSS. 
The development of each COSS element suggested divergent design paths. While only one design was ultimately 
executed for each element in the prototype, the alternative designs deserve further evaluation and serve as a research 
roadmap for optimizing the COSS. Some of the alternative design considerations are discussed below: 
Digital Alarm System. The design adopted in the prototype maintains the annunciator tile approach common in 
conventional control rooms. As with annunciator boards, the design assumes the tiles should always be visible. Due 
to the constraint of having only a single DCS display available for the COSS, this resulted in designating a small 
area of the display for the tiles. The resulting tiles are quite small, although the labels are designed to be legible with 
normal visual acuity from a distance of 6 feet (ca. 2 meters). It is unknown the extent to which a larger alarm tile or 
a different alarm presentation (e.g., alarm lists or plant health “radar” meters) would affect operator performance in 
using the system. The alarm presentation will be the subject of future human factors research on the COSS. 
The alarm tiles also feature trend lines to allow the operator to understand at a glance why an alarm may have 
sounded. Along with the trend lines are vertical tick marks and values to denote low and high warning and alarm 
states. The live value of the sensor is presented prominently as a number at the bottom of each tile. This design was 
selected to present important historic (trending) information and set points with minimal visual clutter. The value of 
tracking such information and the utility of the trend within an alarm has not been tested on actual operators. 
Alternate scaling, line guides, and setpoint presentations should be reviewed to ensure the design is usable by 
operators. 
Currently, the prototype alarm system also features blue confidence intervals to display information from 
multiple sensors. The blue color is distinct and, when there is sensor drift or failure, the span between sensors is 
readily apparent. The prototype does not provide additional guidance beyond the display of the sensor range. The 
design team reviewed several opportunities for providing sensor selection or incorporating a sensor voting system. 
Some of these systems have the potential to increase the complexity of the interface when eliminating particular 
sensors. The value of such added functionality to the operator needs further exploration. 
Computer-Based Procedures.The COSS CBP closely follows traditional paper procedures, primarily adding in-
line sensor information and soft controls relevant to each step. There are a number of design questions regarding the 
best way to present in-line information, completed steps, continuous actions steps, and soft controls, as well as the 
navigation between procedures and the ability of the operator to execute steps out of sequence. Beyond stand-alone 
CBP systems, the COSS recommender system affords the opportunity to present procedural steps in a non-
traditional manner. For example, the recommender system already highlights the components in question and the 
preferred method of mitigating problems in the P&ID view. It may be possible to combine the recommender system 
with the CBP system in a more seamless manner. It may also be possible to generate procedures on the fly, 
representing a dynamic wayfinding procedure system [6]. The best manner of guiding the operator through the 
procedures and the strengths and weaknesses of a combined recommender system with CBP remain important 
potential research topics. 
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram. The P&ID as implemented in the COSS is a relatively standard DCS 
P&ID, although special care was taken to ensure a well laid out and usable human-system interface. Additionally, 
the COSS features some highlighted information from the recommender system when diagnosing faults. A number 
of design questions arose during the design of the COSS, including the optimal level of detail to provide in the 
P&ID. Should the P&ID be simplified to include only those components that can be controlled or measured, or 
should additional detail be provided to give greater context to the operator? The prototype adopts a simplified 
approach, but it may be desirable for operators to be able to zoom in for greater detail.Additionally, the prototype 
P&ID  does not provide any navigation between P&IDs, since the chemical and volume system that is modeled
could be represented in a single display. It is assumed that the convention of having a link to another P&ID would 
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work well for a more complex process flow diagram. Moreover, the functionality of opening another P&ID view 
would be compatible with the design element of tabs used throughout the COSS, whereby different system P&IDs 
would be denoted by different tabs along the top of the main display window. This would facilitate ready navigation 
between P&IDs if needed. Future versions of the COSS prototype will explore different means of navigation 
between  systems that require multiple P&IDs. Another area for design exploration centers on the interaction of the 
recommender system with the P&ID. While the current design features highlighting of specific components, there 
may be greater opportunity to embed the recommender system directly into the P&ID display. This must be done 
obviously yet unobtrusively to the operator. Future versions of the COSS prototype will explore the possibility of 
greater integration of the recommender system and the P&ID. 
Recommender System. The recommender system as currently deployed behaves as a type of ghost agent, 
whereby it monitors plant states in the background and attracts the operator’s attention whenever something appears 
to be malfunctioning. By design, the recommender system cannot take actions and relies instead on alerting the 
operator to the need to take action. We have already mentioned potential enhancements to the recommender system 
through its interface with the CBP and P&ID systems. There remain significant opportunities to further enhance the 
recommender system through its mode of communication with the operator (e.g., addition of verbal alerts), through 
its diagnostic algorithms (e.g., offering a more sophisticated prognostic abilities), and its ability to respond with best 
case recommendations even for situations that fall outside the operating procedures (e.g., positing mitigation 
strategies for beyond design basis accidents). Additional capabilities of the recommender system as well as operator 
interactions with it will be explored in future research. 
Solid human factors engineering practices without evaluation can only go so far in optimizing the design of a 
new system. A formal validation of the COSS prototype is planned in the coming year with a goal to capture 
potential enhancements to operator decision making in the control room. The features of the COSS will be refined to 
optimize operator performance in the face of plant upset conditions. Of course, it is hoped that validation of the 
high-fidelity prototype will pave the way for actual deployment at a nuclear power plant.
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